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CUB 38479 Umpire Decison - The Umpire found that the Board of Referees " based its decision on erroneous findings of fact that it made without regard for the material before it" when it " accepted hearsay statements recorded by insurance officers in interviews with the employers in preference to the claimant's oral evidence and documentary evidence from the employer that corroborated (the claimant's) contentions" . The appeal was allowed.
Appellant: J. Gill
Date: 1997
CUB 61554 Umpire Decison -The Commission is appealing the decision from the Board that overturned their original decision that the claimant, Roger Richardson, had not accumulated sufficient hours of insurable employment to file a claim for benefits. The main question is whether or not the claimant's normal place of residence was Moncton, N.B, where he worked, or Leech, N.B., the village where he was from. He had rented an apartment in Moncton for work purposes. He submitted his driver's license, issued November 2002, that indicated his address was in Leech, as well as he submitted tax documents from 2000 and 2001 that showed his address was in Leech. In another interview with the Commission, the claimant stated on April 23, 2003, that he had a lease and was sharing an apartment in Moncton with a roommate. He added that he had returned to Leech a few weeks after filing his claim which was done in Moncton and was travelling between Leech and Moncton to look for work. The fact that the claimant works in Moncton does not necessarily mean that the claimant is a resident in that city, he might come from one of the surrounding areas and be a normal resident of that area. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2004
CUB 66469 Umpire Decison - The claimant was originally from Cape Breton portion of Nova Scotia and had accumulated some 533 hours of insurable employment. She then moved to Halifax region. By doing so, this changed the rate of unemployment to 6.1%. This meant that she needed 665 hours of insurable employment to qualify. Therefore, for the Halifax area, she did not have sufficient hours of insurable employment. The Board found that the claimant's long-term residency in Cape Breton was sufficient to permit her to qualify for benefits. They felt she should not be penalized because she went to Halifax in order to receive work. They therefore allowed her appeal. The Umpire stated that Board of Referees was correct when they made the decision they did in concluding that the claimant was still resident in Cape Breton and the rates of unemployment for that area should apply to the claimant. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2006
CUB 75058 Umipre Decision - The claimant filed a claim for benefits on December 20, 2004. A benefit period was established for him effective December 5, 2004. On his claim, the he stated that he lived in Pabos Mills, Quebec. He submitted Records of Employment from the Montreal region and also his driver’s licence which indicated that he lived in Montreal. The Commission determined that the claimant’s real place of residence was Montreal and that he did not accumulate the required number of hours of insurable employment during his qualifying period and the minimum number of hours of insurable employment required. The Commission cancelled the benefit period. The Board allowed the claimant’s appeal because in order to work in the construction industry, employees need to have an address in the region where they work and employers are required to ask workers from Gaspésie for a change of address, supported by evidence. The Board of Referees finds that the claimant’s residence for the periods in question was in ¬Gaspés¬ie. Montreal served only a utilitarian purpose in the claimant’s life. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2010
Qualifying Period - Application Error
CUB 76122 Umipre Decision -The claimant was laid off from her employment on January 18, 2008. She filed her application for benefits on February 10, 2008. On March 4, 2008 the Commission wrote to the claimant stating that upon verification of her Social Insurance Number there appeared to be a problem with the maiden name of the claimant’s mother. The matter was apparently resolved on or about March 23, 2008. As a result, the claimant lost two months of insurable hours as her qual¬ifying period should have started the day she was laid off, and not the day the problem was resolved. The appeal was allowed.
Appellant: Claimant
Date: 2010
CUB 27838 Umpire Decison - The claimant served as a member of the jury from November 5, 1991 to July 30, 1992. Upon completion of the trial she did not recommence work until October 13/92 as her employer's business was very slow, and eventually, on December 4, 1992 she was laid off due to a shortage of work. When the claimant applied for benefits, the Commission determined that she did not have enough insurable weeks. It was found that the claimant had sufficient cause to extend her qualifying period and thus had enough weeks to qualify. The Umpire stated that an extension should be granted based on Section 7 (2) (b) of the Act comparing jury duty to an essential component of the justice system and is beyond the control of the individual called to duty. The Umpire refers to the Federal Court of Appeal's judgement in Attorney General of Canada v. Xuan, (1994) 2 F.C. 348 to support his decision. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 1995
CUB 53008 Umpire Decison - The issue before the Board is whether or not a recalculation of weekly benefits can be done 3 years after the start of the claim. The facts of the case are as follows; the claim was established May 25, 1997, with a record from HRDC showing employment from September 4, 1991 to March 31, 1997. The claimant came under the Federal Government Work Force Reduction Program and received $29,136.85 in separation payments, this money was allocated up to April 12, 1998. No money was paid and the benefit period was extended by 47 weeks, the claimant's weekly benefits were calculated to be $342.00. The claimant filed a renewal application to reopen her claim but the Commission invoked s.52(1) of the Act which states that a request for recalculation must be made within 36 months of when the rate was calculated. In this case, this is not a situation where a earlier decision was altered. An appeal in this case is not an appeal of the decision but an appeal of the interpretation of the section. In this case the Commission and the Board found that the effective date for reconsideration was the date when this claimant became eligible for benefits. The claimant's benefits were delayed because her employer provided her with separation payments which, in effect, extended her employment 47 weeks. She was therefore not eligible for benefits until April 11, 1998, that is the date, in the Umpire's view, that the benefits were paid and were payable. They were not payable before because of her separation pay. The appeal was allowed.
Appellant: Joan Gilbert
Date: 2001
CUB 64468 Umpire Decison -The Commission appeals from the decision of a Board of Referees allowing the claimant's appeal from its ruling that he did not qualify for a waiver of the normal two-week waiting period before unemployment benefits became payable. The claimant was pursuing a carpenter's apprenticeship course. When he attended a segment of the course, he had established a claim for unemployment benefits and received benefits after the mandatory two week waiting period. He was employed from March 2 to December 23, 2004. The employer shut down between Christmas and New Year's. He began the next segment of his course on Tuesday, January 4, following the long New Years weekend. The claimant received benefits for the week of December 26 because that was the last week of the benefit period he had established the previous January. The waiver of the waiting period applies if a claimant's circumstances satisfy all three of the conditions set out in section 39.1. The Commission says the claimant satisfied conditions (a) and (c) but not (b) because he had ceased working, not because he was attending his course, but because of a shortage of work. In CUB 62749 Umpire Decison the claimant took time off to get married during the weeks immediately preceding resumption of his apprenticeship course. In CUB 63649 Umpire Decison the claimant took a vacation just before returning to his course. In those cases, the claimant made the decision to cease working for personal reasons. The claimant had no choice the employer shut down for the Christmas - New Years period. The Board of Referees spoke to the spirit of the regulation. They did not err in doing so. The Commission's appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2005
CUB 65963 Umpire Decison / A-314-06 Judgment Of The Federal Court Of Appeal - The claimant worked for Keltic Building Ltd. from December 27, 2003 until December 24, 2004. On December 27, 2004 he applied for employment insurance benefits to return to an apprenticeship program which was scheduled to start on January 4, 2005. On the record of employment, the employer indicated that the reason for the termination of employment was "Apprenticeship Training". The Commission determined that the claimant would have to serve a two-week waiting period as he did not meet the provision of section 39.1 of the Employment Insurance Regulations to have his waiting period waived. The Board of Referees found the claimant to be credible. Prior to training commencing, the claimant's company was shut down over Christmas. He was not laid off, the company was not operating. They accepted that he served the one time only 2 week waiting period in October, 2003. The Umpire stated that it was clearly established that the reason for the claimant ending his employment was not the plant closure for the Christmas break but his return to his apprenticeship program. The claimant unfortunately had to stop working earlier than he wanted to but this was not the reason for his end of employment. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2006
CUB 66592 Umpire Decison - The claimant worked for Bruce Power L.P. from November 22, 2004 until December 22, 2004. On January 13, 2005 he applied for employment insurance benefits to return to an apprenticeship program which commenced on January 3, 2005. On the record of employment, the employer indicated that the reason for the termination of employment was "Apprenticeship Training". The Commission determined that the claimant would have to serve a two-week waiting period as he did not meet the provisions of section 39.1 of the Employment Insurance Regulations to have his waiting period waived. The claimant submitted that he had left his employment to return to his apprenticeship training and had been forced to cease working earlier than he would otherwise have ceased due to a plant closure for the Christmas shutdown. He also added that the co-workers who were in the same position as he was had all had their waiting period waived. Board of Referees allowed the claimant's appeal, stating that he met the requirement of Section 39.1(c) of the Regulations and also 1 week after serving his waiting period after his layoff he went immediately to the apprenticeship training program thus meeting the requirement of section 39.1(a). The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2006
CUB 67214 Umpire Decison - The claimant was pursuing a metal worker apprentice course. He was employed from June 13 to December 22, 2005. He began the next segment of his course on January 3, 2006. His last day of work, December 22 was a Thursday and the last in his four day week. The employer shut down for the period between Christmas Day and New Year's Day. The Board of Referees found that the claimant was enrolled in the third level of his apprenticeship program and that he served his initial two week waiting period for Employment Insurance at the start of his apprentice program therefore allowing him a waiver of his waiting period. The waiver of the waiting period applies if a claimant's circumstances satisfy all three of the condition set out in section 39.1. The Umpire found that the Board of Referees did not err in giving effect to the spirit of the regulation. The appeal was dismissed.
Appellant: Commission
Date: 2006
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