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  • Federal Court Decision #A-516-99 - THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v. TAM-HUU, NGUYEN

    JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

    Date:
    20011115

    Docket:
    A-516-99

    Neutral citation:
    2001 FCA 348

    Umpire's Decision:
    CUB 45132

    CORAM:

    STRAYER, J.A.
    SEXTON, J.A.
    EVANS, J.A.

    BETWEEN:

    THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

    applicant,

    - and -

    TAM-HUU NGUYEN,

    respondent.


    Heard at Toronto, Ontario on Thursday, November 8, 2001.

    REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
    (Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario on Thursday
    November 15, 2001);
    Rendered by


    STRAYER J. A.:

    [1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of an Umpire under the Employment Insurance Act.

    [2] The respondent was discharged from his positions as an "Associate" at Casino Niagara on August 22, 1997. He was subsequently denied benefits under section 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act on the grounds that he lost his job due to his own misconduct. He appealed that decision to a Board of Referees, where a majority of the Board upheld the Commission’s decision. A dissenting member held that the misconduct in question was not severe enough to warrant dismissal, that the respondent should have been given a chance to explain himself, and that at most he should have been reprimanded and offered corrective counselling. On appeal an Umpire set aside the majority decision of the Board on the ground that it was unreasonable in view of the evidence before the Board.

    [3] The Umpire seemed to accept the evidence put before the Board which was as follows. The respondent had persistently requested the telephone number of a female fellow "Associate" although she told him that she was married. On August 21, 1997 he gave her a written message containing symbols and drawing which he translated for her as meaning "Guy loves girls, I love you, girl no love guy...guy kill girl". This was witnessed by another "Associate" who apparently reported it to the employer. The respondent continued to intimidate the woman in question by stating that he would meet her in the parking lot, which she said she did not want him to do.

    [4] There was also evidence that all employees at the Casino were given a book which apparently contained not only statement of Harassment Policy (Exhibit 12-3, 4) but also the Rules of Conduct for Associates of the Casino (Exhibit 12-5). The Umpire appears to have focussed only on the Harassment Policy and seemingly regarded it as to what is "misconduct" under subsection 330(1) of the Act. He understood that Policy require a complaint from a victim before repeated unwanted approaches with sexual implications could be basis for dismissal.

    [5] I am of the view that the learned Umpire erred in setting the Board’s decision as "unreasonable in view of the evidence". To the extent that he was deciding as matter of law that the behaviour of the respondent here could not amount to misconduct because it did not come within a definition in the Harassment Policy of the Casino, he erred in law. Firstly, it is "misconduct" within the meaning of subsection 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act which is relevant, not necessarily as defined by the employer’s stated policies. Generally it has been held that misconduct under the Act requires behaviour which is incompatible with a continuing employment relationship. (see e. g. AGC v. Brissette, (1994) 1 FC 684). Secondly, the learned Umpire in my view took to narrow a view of the employer’s rules of harassment. He pointed only to paragraph 3.1 of the Harassment Policy which identifies as one type of harassment something said or done " of a sexual nature that you do not want or welcome". He took that to mean that there is no harassment unless the victim complaints to the employer, an interpretation which the words cannot support. Further he ignored the more general definition of harassment adopted in section 3.0 of which 3.1 is only an example. That definition, drawn from the Ontario Human Rights Code, defines harassment as

    engaging in a course of vexations comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonable to be known to be unwelcome.

    This policy as transmitted to all employees certainly did not require an express objection or complaint if the conduct ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome. Moreover, the actual Rules of Conduct distributed by Casino Niagara to its employees describes as unacceptable conduct "discourteous, inconsiderate or rude behaviour by an Associate toward...other Associates" and "...intimidating... interfering...with other Associates."

    [6] Thus there was an ample basis in law for the Board to conclude that the behaviour in question was prohibited by the employer. The Rules of Conduct said that such misconduct might "result in Corrective Counselling up to and including separation". This did not, in my view, preclude the employer in law from proceeding directly to separation in the circumstances.

    [7] To extent that the learned Umpire was saying, in whole or in part, that the Board had committed a reviewable error of fact, I must also disagree. An Umpire can only set aside a conclusion based on an erroneous finding of fact of a Board.

    That it made a perverse or capricious or without regard for the material before it, (Employment Insurance Act s. 115).

    Here the Board had evidence before it upon which it could reasonably decide as it did. There was nothing "unreasonable" about its factual conclusions and they cannot set aside even if the Umpire or this Court might have reached a different conclusion on the same evidence.

    [8] The application for judicial review should therefore be allowed, the decision of the Umpire set aside and the matter remitted to the Chief Umpire for reference to an Umpire to confirm the decision of the Board in accordance with these reasons.



    (s) " B. L. Strayer "


    J.A.



    I agree.
    J. Edgar Sexton J. A.
    I agree.
    John M. Evans J. A.
    2011-01-10