Federal Court Decision #A-548-83 - COMMISSION v. HELENE, DUBOIS

JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Date:
January 17, 1984

Docket:
A-548-83

Umpire's Decision:
CUB 8237

"TRANSLATION"

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE. JUSTICE PRATTE
THE HONOURABLE. JUSTICE RYAN
THE HONOURABLE. JUSTICE HUGESSEN

BETWEEN:

CANADA EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION COMMISSION,

applicant,

- and -

HELENE DUBOIS,

respondent.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered from the bench at Montréal
on Tuesday, January 17, 1984.)

THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE PRATTE:

This application made pursuant to s 28 of the Federal Court Act is from a decision of an Umpire pursuant to Part V of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

To begin with, this case raises a question of procedure. The Umpire rendered his decision verbally from the bench on April 11, 1983. He subsequently put this decision in writing on June 30, 1983, in accordance with the requirements of s 70 of the Unemployment Insurance Regulations. Applicant filed its originating notice on April 21, 1983, after the verbal decision had been rendered but a long time before the written decision. Respondent argued that the filing of the originating notice in the case at bar was premature since the decision a quo did not really exist until as it had been put in writing as required by s 70 of the Regulations. We consider that this argument is correct. Allowing the decision of an Umpire to be rendered verbally despite s 70 of the Regulations would raise all kinds of problems. Accordingly, applicant should have waited until the decision was communicated to it in writing before filing its originating notice. However, it does not follow that applicant's application should be dismissed. Applicant asked for leave to amend its originating notice to challenge the verbal decision of April 11, 1983, as affirmed by the written decision of June 30, 1983. Counsel for the respondent mate no objection to this application. The matter should therefore be decided as if applicant had challenged the written decision of June 30, 1983.

It seems clear to the Court that in that decision the Umpire substituted his opinion for that of the Board of Referees on the question of whether respondent was Justified in voluntarily leaving her employment. An Umpire cannot do this without exceeding the powers conferred on him by s 95 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971. For these reasons, his decision must be set aside.

The application will accordingly be allowed, the decision a quo will be set aside and the matter referred back to the Umpire to be again decided by him on the assumption that he cannot substitute his opinion for that of the Board of Referees on the question whether respondent had any justification for voluntarily leaving her employment.

"Louis Pratte"

J.C.F.C.