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  • Federal Court Decision #A-839-97, A-840-97 - CHRISTIAN, BELANGER v. COMMISSION, THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

    JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

    Date:
    19980612

    Docket:
    A-839-97 / A-840-97

    Umpire's Decision:
    CUB 38894 / 38895

    "TRANSLATION"

    CORAM:

    MARCEAU, J.A.
    DÉCARY, J.A.
    LÉTOURNEAU, J.A.

    Docket: A-839-97 (CUB 38894)

    BETWEEN:

    CHRISTIAN BÉLANGER,

    applicant,

    - and -

    CANADA EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
    COMMISSION,

    respondent,

    - and -

    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA.


    Docket: A-840-97 (CUB 38895)

    BETWEEN:

    CHRISTIAN BÉLANGER,

    applicant,

    - and -

    CANADA EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
    COMMISSION,

    respondent,

    - and -

    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA.


    Hearing held at Montréal, Quebec on Friday, June 12, 1998

    REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
    (Delivered from the bench at Montréal, Quebec
    on Friday, June 12, 1998);
    Rendered by


    MARCEAU, J.A.:

    [1] Despite the efforts of counsel for the applicant and the quality of her presentation, we are of the view that these applications for review of the Umpire's dual decision must fail.

    [2] The dispute is purely over the assessment by the Board of Referees—whose decision was simply upheld by the Umpire—of the lengthy oral evidence which was presented before it in addition to the many documents already in the record. Indeed counsel referred to facts the significance of which should have had greater impact on the reaction of the members of the Board, and to statements by witnesses—the applicant in particular—which could have been given greater credit. However, she was unable to point to evidence which was completely overlooked or was assessed in a totally arbitrary manner. It is clear, in our view, that it was reasonable, on the record as a whole, for the Board to have made the finding which it made, and this is enough to make its decision unassailable before the Umpire, and a fortiori before us.

    [3] Counsel thought she should present the alternative argument that the claimant would be unable to invoke the exception in section 43 of the Regulations only during the three months in which his business was engaged in sales. Even if it were acceptable to draw such a dividing line in time—which we doubt because then all seasonal business cases would have to be re-examined—we are not of the view that this could be done in the case before us, it in fact having never been presented with such a potential argument in mind.

    [4] Both applications for review will therefore be dismissed.



    Louis Marceau


    J.A.

    2011-01-10