JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
Date:
January 27, 1994
Docket:
A-1463-92
Umpire's Decision:
CUB 21822
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MacGUIGAN
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE LINDEN
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBERTSON
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,
applicant,
- and -
CHARLENE MAUGHAN,
respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
MacGUIGAN, J.A.:
The respondent was disqualified by the Unemployment Insurance Commission ("the Commission") from receiving unemployment insurance benefits for nine weeks on the ground that she voluntarily left her employment without just cause. A Board of Referees ("the Board") upheld the Commission's decision that she quit work without just cause, but reduced the period of disqualification from nine weeks to six.
The Commission appealed this decision on the basis that the Board had erred in law by reducing the disqualification below the statutory minimum of seven weeks set out in s. 30(1.1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act ("the Act"). The respondent, on her side, did not appeal, but the Umpire, having come to the conclusion that her decision to leave her employment was justified in the circumstances, set aside both the decision of the Board and that of the Commission.
It is unfortunate that the respondent had no legal advice at any stage of these proceedings, and elected not to appear at the hearing before us (although duly notified), so that the only arguments we heard were those of the appellant Commission. In the circumstances, we want to leave open the question of an umpire's jurisdiction over the merits of a disqualification on an issue as to quantum. We would, however, comment that, in cases such as Kuikka, CUB 21932, where a party without benefit of counsel effectively wants to cross-appeal in the course of an appeal by the Commission, it would be appropriate for umpires to utilize their power under s. 82 of the Act to extend the time for filing an appeal to make that possible.
Nevertheless, in our view the Umpire in the case at bar was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact reached by the Board without finding that its decision was perverse. Even if it could be said that this was the basis on which he acted, he gave no reason for arriving at such a conclusion of perversity. Since there appear to have been facts on which the Board could have supported its decision, we must conclude that the Umpire was wrong in substituting his view of the facts for the Board's.
The application must therefore be allowed, the decision of the Umpire herein set aside, and the matter remitted to another Umpire for redetermination on a basis not inconsistent with these reasons.
"Mark R. MacGuigan"
Judge
2011-01-10