February 16, 1993 le 14 octobre 1994
le 16 février 1993 October 14, 1994
ISSUE: Antedate - Good cause for delay in filing claim - Inability due to illness - Section 9(4) Act
APPELLANT: Commission
DECISION: Dismissed
CLAIMANT: Julie ROY
McGillis, UMPIRE:
The Employment and Immigration Commission (the "Commission") appeals from a decision of the Board of Referees (the "Board") permitting the claimant to antedate her claim for benefits.
Ms. Roy was employed as a real estate agent, but resigned on June 27, 1990 for personal and medical reasons. She decided to remain at home for a year to raise her children and work on improving her relationship with her husband. On January 14, 1991, Ms. Roy commenced seeking employment, but did not apply for unemployment insurance benefits until June 28, 1991. The Commission then notified Ms. Roy that she did not qualify for benefits on the basis that she had only one week of insurable employment in her qualifying period rather than the required minimum nineteen weeks. In response, Ms. Roy requested the Commission to antedate for claim to January 14, 1991, indicating that she did not file a claim for benefits at an earlier date because she was incapable of and unavailable for work due to a depression. Furthermore, although she commenced searching for work as early as January 14, 1991, she was not able to work until the beginning of April, 1991 and did not apply for benefits earlier because she was confident of finding work on her own. Ms. Roy also stated that, due to her lack of familiarity with the system and the legislation, she did not realize that the delay in filing her claim would reduce the number of her qualifying weeks and leave her with an insufficient number of weeks to ground a claim for benefits. The Commission rejected the request of Ms. Roy to antedate her claim on the basis that she had not established good cause for the delay in making her claim between January 14 and June 28, 1991.
Ms. Roy appealed to the Board and made oral representations on her own behalf. The Board allowed the appeal and concluded that Ms. Roy had good cause not to apply for benefits for the period from June to December, 1990 because of her inability due to illness to take the proper action. Furthermore, Ms. Roy had good cause for the delay in making her claim between January and June, 1991 because she sought to be self sufficient by obtaining employment and did her utmost to do so during the period in question. The Board also observed that Ms. Roy was not aware of the statutory requirements.
The Commission, in appealing the decision of the Board, submits that the Board erred in law and made an erroneous finding of fact in concluding that Ms. Roy had good cause for the delay in making her claim between January and June, 1991.
I have reviewed the decision of the Board, all of the Exhibits and written submissions in the file and have considered the representations made before me on appeal. I am satisfied following my careful review of this matter that the Board has neither erred in law in making its decision nor has it based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it. In reaching its conclusion, the Board found the explanation proffered by Ms. Roy to be credible, as a result of which it made the factual findings which form the basis for its decision. These factual findings were made carefully and in a considered fashion and ought not to be interfered with on appeal.
With respect to the arguments advanced by the Commission concerning the alleged error of law, I have not been persuaded that the Board erred in considering the Mihai decision CUB 12720 by Reed, J. Although certain aspects of that decision are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, it nevertheless stands for the proposition that the entire circumstances surrounding the claim for benefits must be examined in determining whether good cause for delay exists. I am satisfied that the Board fully examined all of the surrounding circumstances in reviewing the situation of Ms. Roy. Furthermore, although the Board stated that Ms. Roy was not aware of the statutory requirements, it did not rely solely on her ignorance of the law in arriving at its conclusion that she had established good cause for her delay in applying for benefits. Indeed, the reasons of the Board, when read as a whole, indicate that the illness of Ms. Roy and her desire to find work on her own were the motivating factors in its judgment.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
UMPIRE
2011-01-10