IN THE MATTER OF THE Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971
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IN THE MATTER OF a claim for benefit by
HORSLEN, N.
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IN THE MATTER OF an appeal to an Umpire by the claimant
from a decision of the Board of Referees given on
September 21, 1993 at Peterborough, Ontario
CORRESPONDING FEDERAL COURT DECISION: A-517-94
DECISION
(Delivered from the Bench at
Peterborough, Ontario on Agust 16, 1994)
McGILLIS, J.
The appellant appeals from a majority decision of the Board of Referees ("the Board") dated September 21, 1993.
The appellant had worked at a bank for several years as a customer service officer. As a result of a downsizing program, the appellant was offered part-time employment of "approximately 27 hours" a week. She had previously been working 37½ hours as a full-time employee. Rather than accept the offer of part-time employment, the appellant decided to accept a generous severance package from her employer. If she had agreed to work part-time, she would not have received the severance package. The appellant needed full-time employment to support her family of five children.
In its reasons for decision, the Board concluded that the appellant did not have just cause for leaving her employment with the bank.
In arriving at its decision, the Board failed to consider paragraph 28(4)(g) of the Unemployment Insurance Act which provides as follows:
"28(4) For the purposes of this section, "just cause" for voluntarily leaving an employment exists where, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following circumstances, the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leave the employment:
(g) significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary".
In failing to apply this statutory provision to the facts before it, the Board erred in law. Since the facts in this matter are undisputed, I have decided to rescind the majority decision of the Board and give the decision which it should have given.
The facts of this case establish that the appellant was advised by her employer that she would no longer have full-time employment and would be working fewer hours weeklv on a part-time basis. In my opinion, the change in employment status of the appellant from full-time to part-time with a significant reduction in the number of hours to be worked on a weekly basis constituted "...a significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary" with the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, if the appellant had accepted the offer of part-time employment, she would not have generated sufficient income to support her family and would not have received the generous severance package. In the circumstances, she had no reasonable alternative to leaving her employment.
The appeal is therefore allowed.
D. McGillis
UMPIRE
OTTAWA
August 23, 1994