IN THE MATTER OF the Unemployment Insurance Act
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IN THE MATTER OF a claim for benefits by
LISA COLDWELL
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IN THE MATTER OF an appeal to an Umpire by the Canada
Employment and Immigration Commission from a decision by
the Board of Referees given at Whitehorse, Yukon,
on December 20, 1993.
DECISION
JEROME, A.C.J.:
This matter came on for hearing before me at Whitehorse, Yukon on May 10, 1994. This is an appeal by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission fram a unanimous decision of the Board of Referees which held that the claimant did not voluntarily leave her employment without just cause and was entitled to receive the benefits claimed under the Unemployment Insurance Act.
The claimant, Lisa Coldwell, worked as a cashier at Peninsula Consumer Services Co-operative, in Brentwood Bay, British Columbia for sixteen years. On September 27, 1993, she voluntarily left her employment to move to Whitehorse, Yukon with her boyfriend, David Dell (who has since become her common law spouse). Mr. Dell was transferred to Whitehorse to begin a management position. Apparently, the claimant expected to be offered a job from his company at another store location. That store, however, was sold and a five month delay passed before she was employed. She has been working for her common law spouse's employer since February 6, 1994.
The claimant applied for benefits and a claim was established effective October 17, 1993. Based on the above information, the Commission concluded that the claimant did not have just cause for terminating her employment and thus, disqualified her indefinitely from receiving benefits. They based her disqualification on the fact that they concluded the claimant had a reasonable alternative to leaving her employment and did not qualify for the exception set out in subsection 28(4)(b) of the Act relating to spouses and "common law" spouses as there was no evidence indicating that she lived with her boyfriend as a spouse. The claimant appealed that finding to a Board of Referees.
By a decision dated December 20, 1993, the Board unanimously reversed the Commission's decision and allowed the appeal, holding that the claimant had acted reasonably in terminating her employment. Their decision was based in part on its conclusion that she had a reasonable expectation of employment in the Yukon and that her decision to relocate was not made on a whim but indicated that she gave serious consideration to the likelihood of finding gainful employment prior to her departure.
The Commission now challenges this decision. The essence of its attack is that none of the allowable circumstances of the Unemployment Insurance Act are said to apply to the claimant. It argues that the claimant was not married or "common law" at the time of her relocation and following her boyfriend does not constitute "just cause" under subsection 28(4)(b) of the Act. It also alleges that the claimant did not have a reasonable expectation of employment when she quit her job and therefore subsection 28(4)(f) is also inapplicable to her claim.
The only issue in this case is whether it was reasonable, in the circumstances, for the claimant to leave her employment to relocate. Where a person relocates for personal reasons and a valid marriage or common law relationship exists, no issue arises as subsection 28(4)(b) clearly applies. Where, however, the relationship does not fit squarely into the provisions of subsection 28(4)(b), the Commission or Board must look to other justifications for leaving employment, "having regard to all the circumstances".
In the present case, the Board clearly considered the particular circumstances here and concluded on the evidence that the claimant had every reason to believe she would be employed upon her arrival in the Yukon. On the totality of the evidence, they reasoned that she left her employment with a reasonable assurance of alternative employment. This is clearly one of the criteria that constitutes "just cause" under the provisions of the Act.
Generally, whether a claimant has voluntarily left her employment without just cause is a question of fact to be decided on the unique circumstances of each case. The composition of the Board of Referees and the nature of the proceedings before them place them in a better position than the Umpire to make these kinds of judgments. Here, it is apparent that the Board considered the claimant to have had "just cause" for leaving her employment in anticipation of a similar position with her spouse's employer at her newly chosen residence. There was sufficient evidence before the Board upon which it could reasonably come to that conclusion and therefore I ought not to interfere with its decision.
Accordingly, the Commission's appeal is dismissed.
James A. Jerome
UMPIRE
OTTAWA
October 21, 1994