IN THE MATTER of the EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
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In the matter of a claim for benefit by
Suzanne PERRIER
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IN THE MATTER of an appeal by the
claimant from a decision of a Board of Referees given on
November 18, 1999, at Timmins, Ontario
D E C I S I O N
GUY GOULARD, Umpire
This appeal was hear in Timmins, Ontario, on September 5, 2000.
The claimant appeals the unanimous decision of the Board of Referees (the "Board") which upheld the Commission's finding that the claimant did not qualify for employment insurance benefits because she had left her employment with Timmins & District Hospital on September 17, 1999 without just cause.
The claimant worked for the Timmins District Hospital as a registered practical nurse from May 17, 1987 until September 17, 1999. On that date, she left her employment to move to Hearst. She applied for employment insurance benefits on September 27, 1999. Her claim was refused as the Commission determined that she had left her employment without just cause and that quitting her job was not the only alternative in her case.
The claimant appealed to the Board of Referees which dismissed her appeal. She now appeals to the Umpire.
The claimant was present for the hearing and the Commission was represented by Mr. André Chamberlain.
The claimant argued that the Board of Trustees had emphasized in their decision that she had left her employment to move to Hearst to be with her future husband and neglected to take into consideration the first and main reason for the relocation from Timmins to Hearst, that is to seek full-time employment rather than stay in Timmins where she was only a casual employee caught in a cycle of seasonal casual work and regular unemployment when she would be receiving employment insurance benefits.
In her application for benefits the claimant had indicated at question 16 that she had left her employment for the following reason: "I move to Hearst. I submitted my resume to all the hospital. I was only casual", and in Section J she states: "I was working casual at the Timmins District Hosp I've move to Hearst to look for work and I am getting married nest year. I plan to make this my permanent address".
In a letter addressed to Timmins Human Resources Development Canada on October 16, 1999, the claimant reiterates that her objective in moving to Hearst was to obtain full-time employment and that she had been informed that the chances of getting full-time work there were very good. She also states that she had left her name with all her employers in case of possible work.
In her presentation before me, the claimant acknowledged that it would have been better if she had been able to secure employment before relocating but that it was difficult to search for employment in Hearst while still living in Timmins. She also indicated that had she stayed in Timmins, the situation of employment would not have improved and that she would have been on employment insurance benefits in the fall of 1999 as well as this year. She stated that her objective was to get out of that cycle and work on a full-time basis throughout the year.
Mr. Chamberlain referred to Section 29 (c) (vi) which reads:
(c) just cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following:
(vi) reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future.
He argued that the claimant had other reasonable alternatives and should have confirmed an employment before quitting her position in Timmins. He further argued that the claimant's choice had been a personal one that did not meet the requirements of Section 29.
Section 29 (c) also includes subsection (xiv) which states:
(xiv) any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed.
The Board's decision contains the following finding of fact and decision:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
THE Board finds as a fact that the claimant voluntarily left her employment in order to move to Hearst to be near her future husband. This was a personal choice. There was no urgency to move without having first secured employment prior to quitting her job.
The Board relied on the jurisprudence found in Landry (A-1210-92) and concludes that the claimant did not demonstrate that she had no reasonable alternative but to leave her employment when she did. She had no guarantee of obtaining a position in Hearst. She could have continued working at Timmins District Hospital until she had found a job in Hearst. Further, relocating in order to be closer to her future husband does not constitute just cause. In CUB 20793, the Umpire stated: "..Relationship purely voluntary. She had a right to do so but no obligation".
As the Board finds that the claimant left her employment without just cause, it follows that the claimant must be disqualified for each week in the benefit period following the waiting period.
DECISION: It is the unanimous decision of the Board that the appeal be dismissed.
The Board found as a fact that the claimant had moved to be near her future husband, that she had a reasonable alternative to leave her employment in Timmins and should have continued to work there until she found a job in Hearst. Based on those finding of facts they dismissed the claimant's appeal.
I find that the Board erred in their determination of facts. They gave primary importance to a factor that was given as a secondary motive by the claimant throughout her written and oral evidence. They failed to consider the importance of the fact that the claimant only had casual employment in Timmins and had to rely on employment insurance benefits on a seasonal basis. There is no indication that they took into consideration that the claimant had not only taken steps to find employment in Hearst but also left her name with her employers in Timmins.
Based on those errors, I am tempted to reverse the Board's as well as the Commission's decisions but I feel that the matter should be sent back to an other Board of Referees for review and to arrive at a decision that will take into consideration and give appropriate weight to all the facts in the case.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is set aside and the matter is to be send to a differently constituted Board for redetermination. The decision of the Board dated November 18, 1998 will be removed from the appeal docket.
GUY GOULARD
UMPIRE
OTTAWA, Ontario
September 22, 2000