IN THE MATTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
- and -
in the matter of a claim for benefit by
DAVID TRASK
- and -
IN THE MATTER of an appeal by the Claimant from a decision of a Board of Referees
given at Saint John, NB, on the I9th day of July, 2000
D E C I S I O N
Hon. David G. Riche
The claimant stated at the hearing that he left his job in Toronto to return to Saint John because his natural mother was ill. He stated that he had met her the year previously and felt he had an obligation to return to St. John. He stated at the hearing he could return to his job in Toronto any time, but wanted to find a job in the Maritimes. He stated that when he first returned, he stayed at his mother's house and helped drive her to and from the hospital. He then came to Saint John to look for a job.
The Board found that while the claimant had a valid personal reason to leave his job, it was not necessary that he care for his mother and so he did not have just cause to voluntarily leave his employment pursuant to Sections 29 and 30 of the EI Act.
The appellant in this case provided me with two decisions, CUB 35793 and CUB 29760, both decisions of Umpire Stevenson. Justice Stevenson stated:
In the circumstances in which Miss McLean found herself, I am satisfied that she had no reasonable alternative to leaving her employment in order to fulfil her filial obligations. It would be callous to suggest that the purchase of care for one's parent or parents is a reasonable alternative for a person in Miss McLean's situation."
In these circumstances, and in the case of Chatkana, Justice Stevenson found that the necessary attendance to care for one's mother or father was a just cause and for those reasons reversed the decision of the Commission.
In this particular case, Mr. Trask found himself in a situation where his mother was ill and in need of transportation and care which could not be provided by her elderly husband who was also ill. Mr. Trask therefore felt an obligation to provide that care.
Applying the decisions which I have referred to by Umpire Stevenson, I am satisfied that Mr. Trask's conduct can be included under s. 29(c) (xiv) as a reasonable circumstance under which a person would be expected to quit their employment in order to care for a family member. On his arrival in New Brunswick, of course, it was obligatory on him to seek work, which I understand he did.
For these reasons the decision of the Board is set aside. The appeal is allowed as I find the claimant has established just cause.
David G. Riche
Umpire
March 25, 2001
St. John's, Newfoundland