CUB 57228

KRINDLE, Hon.

The commission appeals from a finding by the board of referees that the claimant had just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment because of significant changes in his work duties as contemplated by sections 29 and 30 of the Act. The facts as found by the board included the following:

"He told the Board that he was given new responsibilities 2 years before he resigned. He says he was placed in a lower position and in effect became a purchasing agent whereas before he dealt first hand with the aquatics program. The Board believes there were significant changes in the claim work duties under Section 29 of the Act."

The commission takes issue with this finding of fact because the claim that there were significant changes in his work and duties was not originally given by the claimant as being his reason for quitting his employment. Rather, at the outset, the claimant said he was quitting to return to school. In the subsequent written information the claimant stated that he left the department to better himself and because the department was greatly under-resourced and provided no opportunities for movement. It was only in the course of his testimony before the board that the claimant turned to events relating to a significant change two years earlier to explain his situation. I note that significant changes in his work duties two years earlier are not incompatible with a person's deciding that he had to return to school because the department in which he worked was greatly under-resourced and could not provide opportunity for movement or advancement. Those significant changes could well cause one to consider whether it was possible to remain where one is, could well cause a person to come to the conclusion that his present employement offered no future and that he had to return to school.

There are statements in the case law to the effect that weight can reasonably be attached to initial explanations given for action, even if those explanations are contradicted by later sworn statements. There are common sense reasons behind those statements. With added sophistication about the legal requirements, there is motive to tailor one's testimony to the legal requirements. A board of referees could well prefer the unsworn initial statement to the later sworn testimony, notwithstanding that the initial statement is not under oath. I do not take any of those decisions to require that boards of referees, as a matter of law, find facts in accordance with the earliest statements and reject the later. The weight to be attached to evidence is a matter for the board of referees. In the present case the board accepted the explanation of the claimant given orally before them notwithstanding that it had not been advanced earlier. It was open to the board to make that finding of fact.

Having found the facts as it did, it was open to the board of referees reasonably to come to the ultimate conclusion that it did, namely that the claimant should not be disqualified pursuant to sections 29 and 30 of the Act. The appeal of the commission is dismissed.

Ruth Krindle

UMPIRE

OTTAWA, Ontario
March 5, 2003