In the Matter of the Employment Insurance Act,
and
In the Matter of a claim for unemployment benefits by
Crystal Boudreau
and
In the Matter of an Appeal by the Commission from the decision of a Board of Referees given at Fredericton, New Brunswick on June 4, 2002
Appeal heard at Fredericton, New Brunswick on February 4, 2003
DECISION
R. C. STEVENSON, UMPIRE:
The Commission appeals from the decision of a Board of Referees allowing Mrs. Boudreau's appeal from a Commission ruling that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she had voluntarily left her employment without just cause.
In 1999 Mrs. Boudreau, who was then 20 years of age, moved from New Brunswick to Vancouver where she was employed as a legal secretary from September 1999 until March 22, 2002. She then returned to New Brunswick as she was to be married here on September 14, 2002. She had met her fiancé in New Brunswick in 1999 and had dated him before going to Vancouver. She had returned to New Brunswick twice while working in British Columbia and became engaged in November 2001. As planned, she married in September 2002.
In her letter of appeal to the Board of Referees Mrs. Boudreau said "I moved to New Brunswick to be with my fiancé in order to get our affairs in order and to plan the wedding." She had been told by a Commission employee that she would be entitled to benefits as long as her wedding was going to take place within two years of moving.
The Board of Referees found that Mrs. Boudreau left her employment to return to New Brunswick to live in closer proximity to her fiancé and to plan her wedding and that she unsuccessfully sought employment before returning east and had been actively seeking employment in Fredericton since returning. The Board referred to the decision of Justice Reed in CUB 27800. While the facts in that case were different the Umpire said, as quoted by the Board of Referees:
The Commission's position, as I understand it from past experience with thee kinds of claims, has always been that if the marriage is reasonably imminent just cause for leaving employment in order to move to a new geographical location will be found. The Commission does not demand that just cause can only exist when an individual leaves employment the day after the marriage.
In the present case the Board of Referees concluded:
The Board unanimously concludes that the claimant had just cause to leave her employment to relocate closer to her fiancé and that after consideration of all the circumstances leaving her employment was her only reasonable alternative. The Board also finds that the claimant's marriage was reasonably imminent when she left her employment.
In CUB 28188 I said:
I understand that it is the Commission's policy to recognize application of paragraph 28(4)(b) [of the Unemployment Insurance Act, now paragraph 29(c)(ii) of the Employment Insurance Act] to a relocation prior to a pending marriage so long as the separation from employment takes place in reasonable proximity to the claimant's wedding day.
Paragraph 29(c)(ii) of the Employment Insurance Act recognizes an obligation to accompany a spouse to another residence as one of the specific circumstances to be considered in determining whether, having regard to all the circumstances, a claimant had just cause to leave an employment.
There is no hard and fast rule nor is there a rule of thumb as to how close a planned wedding date has to be to the date of leaving one's employment in order to be "reasonably imminent" or "in reasonable proximity". In CUB 28188 I dismissed the appeal of a claimant who had moved the relatively short distance from Fredericton, New Brunswick to Moncton, New Brunswick in mid-May 1993 with plans to marry in late August or early September of that year. In CUB 49975 the claimant had moved from British Columbia to Toronto in September 1999 with plans to marry on January 1, 2000. Again I ruled against the claimant and said:
While it would have been difficult, for reasons of distance, for Ms. Krajinovic to secure employment in Ontario before leaving her job in British Columbia, she did have the reasonable alternative of continuing to work until a date closer to January 1.
In CUB 54025 Umpire Goulard dealt with a claimant who had moved from Winnipeg to Thompson, Manitoba in November 2000 to begin living with her fiancé who she planned to marry in late March or early April of 2001. The Board of Referees found the wedding was imminent when the claimant moved and that she had just cause to leave her employment. The Umpire reversed the decision saying the claimant's decision did not result from an obligation to accompany a spouse and she could have pursued the long distance relationship until she found employment.
While the Umpire decisions I have referred to, including two of my own, support the view that a marriage six months in the future is not reasonably imminent, that is a question of fact and if determined in favour of a claimant by a Board of Referees is one of the circumstances to be considered in addressing the issue of just cause. The effect of the distance factor on one's ability to carry on an effective job search is also relevant. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Dueck, File A-535-96, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a decision where I had allowed the appeal of a claimant who had moved from Saskatoon to Moncton to be with her fiancé. In my decision, CUB 33865, I said:
In this case one must consider the distance factor. It would be virtually impossible for Ms. Dueck to conduct a job search in the Moncton area while living and working in Saskatoon. The expense of travelling from Saskatoon to Moncton would make it difficult, if not financially impracticable, for one living and working in Saskatoon to come to Moncton to look for work before giving up her job in Saskatchewan. It is a case where I conclude, having regard to all the circumstances, that the claimant had just cause to leave her employment. That conclusion can be reached within the language of subsection 28(4) without any suggestion that the umpire is attempting to change the provisions of the Act.
After careful consideration I cannot find that the Board of Referees erred in law or in principle or that it based its decision on any erroneous finding of fact.
The Commission's appeal is dismissed.
RONALD C. STEVENSON
Umpire
FREDERICTON, NEW BRUNSWICK
February 27, 2003