CUB 58434

KRINDLE, Hon.

The commission appeals a decision of the board of referees which permitted her an antedate in the filing of her re-application for benefits. The board determined that the claimant had good cause for delay in filing that application.

It is clear that the claimant was approximately two months late in the filing of her application for benefits. On the face of the material, it was the claimant's ignorance of the law that caused her to be late in filing, a factor which traditionally has not been held to justify a late filing.

However, there are other factors that must be considered. The claimant had made an initial application in the summer of 2001 and had established her entitlement to benefits. She knew, in the summer, that she would be unemployed again for a short period in December. She had been told, in the summer, that she would not have to re-apply for benefits in December, that her claim for the Christmas break could be renewed over the telephone. In December, when she attempted to renew her claim as instructed, she was told over the phone that she could not do so, she would have to come in. What she was not told was that the law had changed between the time of her initial application and her attempted renewal. What was required of her at Christmas, by virtue of the change in the law, was not to renew a valid claim, but to file a new claim. The time parameters for filing that new claim are precise. The claimant was aware, in December, that she would be returning to work after the Christmas break and that she would have to claim again, in February. In December, she decided to wait until February to renew both claims at the same time because of the complicated, time-consuming procedure.

The board of referees allowed the ante-date, having determined that the claimant acted as a reasonable person would have acted in the circumstances. That, first of all, is an entirely fact driven conclusion. Only if I could say that the finding as to reasonableness was perverse or capricious would interference be justified. In this case, the fact of the change in legislation between the initial application and the attempt at renewal over the telephone is significant. The claimant had been told by an agent of the commission that she would not have to re-apply at Christmas. The claimant was entitled to rely on that information. In light of that, I find the conclusion of the board to have been one which it could reasonably have arrived at on the evidence.

The appeal is dismissed.

Ruth Krindle

UMPIRE

OTTAWA, Ontario
July 25, 2003