CUB 70293

Hon. David G. Riche

The issue in this case was whether or not the claimant had just cause for voluntarily leaving his employment in accordance with sections 29 and 30 of the EI Act.

The Board of Referees found that the claimant had just cause for leaving his employment based on section 29(c) of the Act. They referred to subsec. (vii) - significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary. The claimant had been working for a company in textiles. The claimant was then working for a socks company. Apparently the textiles company had been owned by someone and then he was put on the payroll of the socks company which was owned by that someone's wife. The claimant who had been working some ten years with the textiles company had been employed on a salary basis. When the claimant was transferred to the socks company he was then put on an hourly rate of pay. The claimant was identified in his record of employment with the textiles company as being a mechanic. With the socks company he was stated as being a hosiery technician.

In the evidence before the Board of Referees, the indication from the employer was that employees would not get 40 hours every week and it was unclear if the claimant had experienced any changes. The claimant's concern was that he would be working rotating shifts and would be moving from a salary to an hourly rate, and would not be getting benefits. The employer confirmed that the claimant had a health plan but did not have any benefits when he moved to the socks company. The employer stated, however, that the claimant's duties would be the same.

The employer at the socks company alleged that the claimant had removed products from the plant and he was asked to resign.

The Commission were of the view that the claimant had just cause for leaving his employment as there were significant changes to his duties and wages.

The Board in its finding of fact found that both companies did not keep their employees fully aware and informed of the changes taking place between the textiles and the socks companies. They also found that the claimant's working conditions did change considerably.

On the issue of theft, the Board concluded that that only became an issue after the claimant had quit his employment. They also found that the evidence was at best contradictory.

When the matter came before me, the representative of the employer felt that the Board of Referees did not provide the detail that was necessary in order to satisfy their decision under s. 114 of the Act. He argued that the Board should have provided greater detail in their reasoning as to how they came to the conclusions they did. Further, the employer felt that they did not have sufficient time to fully present their case before the Board.

Based on these allegations the employer sought to have a new hearing before a new board.

The employer's representative then referred me to Exhibits 9-4 to 9-6 to substantiate their allegations of theft.

I have considered this matter and I am satisfied that this matter should not be returned to a new board as there is, in my view, sufficient detail provided by the Board of Referees in their three-page decision. They dealt with all the issues that were before them and considered the evidence presented by the employer and the claimant. Having considered the evidence, they came to the conclusion that there was a substantial change in the claimant's working conditions.

When the matter came before me, the employer's representative agreed that the claimant had moved from being a salaried employee to being an hourly paid employee. Further, he did not allege that the Board was wrong when it found that the claimant had lost benefits when the change was made from one company to the other between the owners who were husband and wife. The Board's decision was based on s. 29(c)(vii) of the Act. There appears to be no doubt from the evidence that the working conditions of the claimant did change considerably when he moved from one company to the other as they found. That, in itself, was sufficient to find just cause for quitting his employment if they were satisfied that in these circumstances the claimant had no other alternative but to quit his employment.

One must remember that this claimant was employed for ten years with the textiles company under salary and benefits. Then without his consent, he was transferred to the the socks company and had his method of remuneration altered together with benefits.

Having considered the position of the employer in this appeal, the claimant and the Commission, I am satisfied that I must find in favour of the claimant and confirm the decision of the Board of Referees as being sound both on the evidence and the law. For these reasons the appeal of the employer is dismissed.

David G. Riche

Umpire

April 15, 2008
St. John's, NL