CUB 68255
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IN THE MATTER of the EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
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IN THE MATTER of a claim by
SANDRA ROBBINS
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IN THE MATTER of an appeal to an Umpire by the claimant from a decision by the Board of Referees given on September 21, 2006, at Burnaby, British Columbia
DECISION
MAX M. TEITELBAUM, Umpire
This is an appeal by the claimant from a decision of the Board of Referees which upheld the Commission's determination that the claimant had voluntarily left her employment without just cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits.
An initial claim for benefits was established for Ms. Robbins effective July 9, 2006 (exhibit 2). The Record of Employment submitted in support of her application indicated that the claimant had been employed by Upper Canada Soap and Candle from November 9, 2005 to July 7, 2006 at which time she quit (exhibit 3). On her application for benefits, the claimant advised the Commission that she left her job on July 10 in order to move to British Columbia as she had become engaged to be married and she had a job in British Columbia although it did not start until August 14, 2006 (exhibits 2-6 and 2-7).
When the claimant was later contacted by the Commission, she clarified that she did not know at the time she quit her job and purchased the air tickets for British Columbia that she had a job to start on August 14, although that job eventually fell through. During this telephone conversation, the claimant also indicated that her fiancé was not the father of her son (exhibit 6).
Based on the information before it, the Commission determined that the claimant had voluntarily left her employment without just cause because she had failed to demonstrate that she had no reasonable alternative to leaving when she did. In the Commission's view, a reasonable alternative to leaving would have been to secure a job in British Columbia and then quit. The Commission therefore imposed an indefinite disqualification to benefits pursuant to sections 29 and 30 of the Employment Insurance Act effective July 10, 2006 (exhibit 7).
Ms. Robbins appealed to a Board of Referees stating that she felt that she was being treated unfailry and being penalized for making life changes and trying to improve her and her sons life. She maintained that she was not asking for months and months of benefits, rather she was simply asking for some assistance from a plan which she had paid into for so many years. Although she was confident she would find a job within a month, in the meantime she had been in British Columbia for seven weeks with no income and her bills were unpaid because the money simply wasn't there (exhibits 8 and 9).
The majority of the Board of Referees dismissed the claimant's appeal stating its reasons, in part, as follows:
Findings of Fact/Application of the Law:
The Board finds as fact that the claimant did not have a wedding date set, nor did she secure a job prior to leaving her employment (Exhibit 6). The Board, therefore, finds as fact that this was not a case of a claimant required to follow a spouse because she and her fiancé had not lived together for a year or more.
The Board finds that while the claimant may have had good reasons for quitting her job, they did not amount to just cause for doing so as they, in effect, amounted to a personal choice.
The Board was guided by CUB's 49011 and 42154A as well as Rena Astronomo (A-141-97) in reaching its decision.
The Board finds as fact that the Commission properly applied the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the Act in this case.
Relying on the decisions of Umpires in CUBs 62673 and 54861, the minority Board member would have allowed Ms. Robbins appeal, on the grounds that she had established just cause for leaving. The minority Board member states:
In this case, the claimant believed that she had employment. The fact that this did not materialize was no fault of the claimant.
Regarding the claimant's anticipated marriage, her and her fiancé were in a serious, committed relationship.
In Exhibit 12-2, provided to the Board of Referees, just prior to the hearing, the claimant stated, "My son needed to finish out the school year and if we waited until closer to the wedding date then he would be pulled of school mid-year. We also unexpectedly found a new home very quickly."
The minority accepts the claimant's consideration for her child and understands how relocating during the school year could be very disruptive.
The minority also accepts that, by finding a new home very quickly, the claimant wanted to move her household quickly, relieving the financial burden of paying for two residences, one in Ontario and the other in BC.
...
Considering all the facts and circumstances in this case (Section 29(c)(xiv) of the EI Act), the minority member finds that the claimant had just cause for leaving her employment in order to continue her relationship, establish a new household for herself, her school-aged child and her fiancé, in anticipation of the pending marriage, and, therefore, would allow the appeal.
The claimant now appeals to an Umpire citing all three grounds of appeal set out in section 115 of the Act. In her letter of appeal (exhibit 16.3) she writes the following:
My fiancé and I became engaged 2 months before we moved out to British Columbia, we had not set a date until after we arrived in BC, as my fiancé's mother is undergoing treatment for breast cancer and we could not finalize any plans until after her prognosis.
I had secured a full time position a week before we moved out to British Columbia to start Aug 14, 2006, unfortunately this fell threw and I continued with my E.I. application. Seven weeks after being in British Columbia I was denied because I was told that quitting my job was not my only alternative. I would like to see how many people are able to secure a full-time position in another province by simply sending out a resume.
At this point I am now working and moving on with my life with my husband-to-be and our son but I am very disappointed in the whole system, I fail to see why it is relevant that my fiance is not my son's father as S.Turton states in my file. I am applying for Unemployment not Welfare or Child Support. I have shown that I job searched before and after may arrival in British Columbia and how difficult it is to secure a job living in another province. I certainly would not want to have abuse [sic] the systems as so many people do, or have collected Social Assistance as suggested to me by the E.I. Office. I was simply seeking help from the system that I have contributed to for so many years.
After reading the documents in this file and after hearing the claimant who states that before leaving for British Columbia she had secured full-time employment to start on August 14, 2006, I am satisfied that the claimant had just cause to leave her employment to move to British Columbia. She left her job to move to British Columbia to get married. She is now married. Before she left her job in Ontario, she sought and found employment in British Columbia.
In CUB 67172 (Malet-Veale) the Umpire addressed the issue of the correct approach to the interpretation and application of paragraph 29(c). The section is to be given a generous and liberal interpretation and it necessitates an assessment of all the unique and individual circumstances of each case in order for a determination to be made of whether just cause exists. He wrote:
... the language used in the paragraph (29(c)) makes it unequivocally clear that a determination as to whether just cause exists, requires an examination of all the unique and particular circumstances of each case in order to establish whether, on a balance of probabilities, a claimant had no reasonable alternative but to leave their employment when they did. The subparagraphs of paragraph 29 were not intended to fetter or circumscribe or limit the Board or Umpire's discretion. It is not imperative for a claimant to fit into one of the categories set out in these paragraphs in order for there to be a finding of just cause.
Accordingly, while reasons such as wishing to relocate to be closer to one's family may not constitute just cause in one claimant's case, that will not always be true. In some instances such a reason is nothing more than a good personal reason for leaving one's employment while in other cases, because of the circumstances, it will be just cause. It has generally been accepted by Umpires that just cause exists if leaving the employment is what a reasonable and prudent person would do in similar circumstances.
That reasoning, in my view, is equally applicable to the facts of this case and I agree with the minority Board member that this claimant has demonstrated just cause for leaving her employment and should not be disqualified from receiving benefits.
I therefore allow the present appeal and set aside the decision of the Board of Referees.
Max M. Teitelbaum
UMPIRE
OTTAWA, Ontario
May 17, 2007