Subsection 8(2) of the Employment Insurance Act provides for an extension of the qualifying period where a claimant can establish that he or she was not working by reason of: (a) illness, injury, quarantine or pregnancy; (b) confined in jail, penitentiary or other similar institution; (c) in attendance at a course of instruction or other program to which he or she has been referred by the Commission; (d) in receipt of payments under a provincial law on the basis of having ceased to work for the reason that continuing to work would have entailed danger to the person, the person's unborn child or a child whom the person is breast-feeding. These circumstances have a common feature in that they are all concerned with situations where the claimant is not available for work through external circumstances beyond his or her control.
Subsection 8(2) Employment Insurance Act
Garland v. C.E.I.C., [1985] 2 F.C. 508 (F.C.A.) A-1132-84
Crupi v. C.E.I.C., [1986] 3 F.C. 3 (F.C.A.) A-451-85
The purpose of the legislation is to provide benefits to people who, for legitimate reasons, have become unemployed. To facilitate this end, subsections 7(2) of the Employment Insurance Act permits the extension of the qualification period for certain legitimate reasons.
Canada (A.G.) v. Xuan, [1994] 2 F.C. 348 (F.C.A.) A-1393-92
The extension provisions in subsection 8(2) of the Employment Insurance Act do not apply to claimants engaged in fishing. This does not constitute a violation of the equality rights guaranteed by section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Clarke v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1990], F.C.J. No. 436 (F.C.A.) A-295-89
The word "quarantine" in paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act is related to illness or injury.
Deigan v. Canada (A.G.), September 30, 1998, F.C.J. No. 1561 (F.C.A.) A-114-98
In order to determine if a person is an inmate of a prison or similar institution, the nature of the institution itself must be considered. "Similar institution" means something very closely resembling a prison. Some common features or points of resemblance are not sufficient. The question which must be answered is what is the reason, purpose or object of the confinement. For example, the section has been held not to apply to an individual remanded to a mental hospital prior to trial, where the detention is not custodial or punitive.
Crupi v. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, [1986] 3 F.C. 3 (F.C.A.) A-451-85
The section does include those prisoners who, while not physically confined, are not available for employment. It has been held that the provision "must necessarily include those prisoners who, while not still remaining in physical confinement, are nevertheless still within the class since they are not yet available for employment." Therefore, a person released from prison on temporary absence, required to live on his parents' farm and subject to supervision by a probation officer and other conditions, was considered to be "confined" within the meaning of this provision because he "was just as institutionalized on the facts of this case as if he were confined to a building built for the purpose of confining prisoners."
Garland v. C.E.I.C., [1985] 2 F.C. 508 (F.C.A.) A-1132-84
Canada (A.G.) v. Xuan, [1994] 2 F.C. 348 (F.C.A.) A-1393-92
The purpose of subsection 8(3) of the Act is to create a safeguard for claimants to ensure those who are in receipt of earnings paid because of a complete severance are able to include in their qualifying period the hours they worked in the 52 weeks prior to their termination. Subsection 8(3) has the effect of extending the qualifying period so that, in effect, the 52 weeks prior to termination are added to the allocation period for the purpose of determining the qualifying period. In this way, hours actually worked in the 52-week period prior to termination would be taken into account in calculating the claimant's qualifying hours. That is the purpose of subsection 8(3).
However, subsection 8(3) only operates when it is necessary, that is, when allocation of earnings payable by reason of a complete severance postpone the date of interruption of earnings. Where, under the regulatory scheme, allocation does not postpone the date of interruption of earnings, subsection 8(3) does not have to operate.
Shebib v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 2003 F.C.A. 88 (F.C.A.) A-24-01
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2009-05-06